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(Mis)Understanding a Banking Industry
in Transition
Under deregulation the industry became dysfunctional—but economists still won't
revise their anti-regulation script.
William K. Black
The U.S. financial system is, once again, in crisis. Or, more precisely, twin crises—first, huge numbers of defaults
among subprime mortgage borrowers, and second, massive losses for the holders of new-fangled investments
comprised of bundles of loans of varying risk, including many of those subprime mortgages.
These crises should shock the nation. Our largest, most sophisticated financial
institutions have followed business practices that were certain to produce massive
losses—practices so imprudent, in precisely the business task (risk management) that is
supposed to be their greatest expertise, that they have created a worldwide financial
crisis.

For more on the current financial
crises, see Tom Palley's article on
the Fed's failed paradigm, in this
issue, and Larry Peterson's webonly article about the
subprime/securitization panic.

Why? Because their CEOs, acting on the perverse incentives created by today's outrageous compensation systems,
engaged in practices that vastly increased their corporations' risk in order to drive up reported corporate income and
thereby secure enormous increases in their own individual incomes. And those perverse incentives follow them out
the door: CEOs Charles Prince, at Citicorp, and Stanley O'Neal, at Merrill Lynch, had dismal track records of
similar failures prior to the latest disasters, but they collected massive bonuses for their earlier failures and will
receive obscene termination packages now. Pay and productivity (and integrity) have become unhinged at U.S.
financial institutions.
As this goes to print, Treasury Department officials are working with large financial institutions to cover up the
scale of the growing losses. This is the same U.S. Treasury that regularly prates abroad about the vital need for
transparency. And a former Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, who failed utterly in his fiduciary duty as lead board
member at Citicorp to prevent the series of recent abuses, will become Citicorp's new CEO.
To even begin to understand events in the U.S. and global banking industries, you have to look back at the seismic
shifts in the industry over the past 30 to 40 years, and at the interplay between those shifts and government policy.
The story that continues to unfold is one of progressively worse policies that make financial crises more common
and more severe.
These policies have their boosters, though. Chief among them are neoclassical banking and finance economists,
whose ideology and methodologies lead them into blatant misreadings of the realities of the industry and the causes
of its failures. When the history of this crisis-ridden era in global finance is written, the economists will no doubt be
given a significant share of the blame.
A New Era of Crisis
The changes in the U.S. banking industry in recent decades have been so great that a visitor from the 1950s would
hardly recognize the industry. Over two decades of intense merger and acquisition activity has left a far smaller
number of banks, with assets far more concentrated in the largest ones. Between 1984 and 2004, the number of

banks on the FDIC's rolls fell from 14,392 to 7,511; the share of the U.S. banking industry's assets held by the ten
largest banks rose from 21% in 1960 to nearly 60% in 2005. At the same time, nonbank businesses that lend, save,
and invest money have proliferated, as have the products they sell: a vast array of new kinds of loans and exotic
savings and investment vehicles. And the lines have blurred between all of the different players in the industry—
between banks and thrifts (e.g., savings and loans), between commercial banks and investment banks. These
changes were made possible by the deregulation of the industry. Bit by bit, beginning in the 1970s, the banking
regulations put into place in the wake of the Great Depression were repealed, culminating in the Gramm-LeachBliley Act in 1999, which removed the remaining legal barriers to combining commercial banking, investment
banking, and insurance under one corporate roof. The new world of combined financial services is exemplified by
the deal, inked (but ostensibly illegal) before the 1999 law was passed, that merged the insurance and investmentbanking giant Travelers with Citibank, at the time the nation's number-one commercial bank.
These transformational changes in domestic banking, along with the related effects of economic globalization both
in the United States and abroad, have produced recurrent crises in the financial sector. Indeed, the current era has
seen over 100 major banking crises, in countries around the globe. Thomas Hoenig, head of the Kansas City Federal
Reserve Bank, emphasized the remarkable and disturbing facts in a meeting with fellow heads of supervision:
A 1996 survey by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] ... found that 73 percent [133 of 181]
of their member countries had experienced significant banking problems during the preceding 15
years. Many of these problems led to substantial declines in GDP [and] serious disruptions in
credit and capital markets....
To date none of these crises has led to a global Great Depression. Only a
few were larger in absolute terms than the 1980s S&L debacle in the United
States. Yet many imposed a much greater relative cost, measured as a
percentage of the country's GDP. Some caused severe, depression-like
economic problems in the affected nation. Some produced contagion effects
that caused severe crises in other nations. And acute banking crises can
cause long-term harm. Japan is a rich nation and can afford a 15-year
banking crisis—but the world economy cannot. The crisis cut Japan's
economic growth to near-zero for a decade, in turn creating contagion
effects in the many countries for whom Japan was a major trading partner or
a significant source of capital investment. Tens of millions of people remain
in poverty in Asia and Africa as a result.
The recurrent banking crises have come as a shock to the United States,
given the dearth of bank failures over the first three decades after World
War II. The first severe postwar U.S. banking crisis was stemmed from the
large loans that top U.S. banks made to sovereign borrowers (i.e., nations),
largely in Latin America. The banks had claimed that sovereign loans
offered high returns with minimal default risk because the nation could
always repay the loan by printing more money. Citibank head Walter
Wriston notoriously implied that countries could not go broke. The claim
was absurd. However, banking regulators took no effective action to
restrain this lending.
The 1982 Mexican default led to contagion and fears of an international
meltdown, but the Federal Reserve and the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) took effective action. Brazil experienced a long economic
slowdown that contributed to an imminent default on its loans from major

Deposit Insurance Spreads, Despite
Economists' Protests
Banking economists now overwhelmingly
criticize deposit insurance. This represents a
major change. The prior consensus, shared by
Milton Friedman and John Kenneth Galbraith
alike, praised deposit insurance for ending
the periodic runs on uninsured banks that
helped cause the Great Depression. Today,
however, the conventional economic wisdom
is that deposit insurance may stop runs, but at
the expense of encouraging banks to make
imprudent loans and take excessive risks.
(Neoclassical economists widely view
insurance as inherently creating an incentive
for insured parties to act in unduly risky ways
because of the safety net that insurance
provides—a phenomenon termed "moral
hazard.")
This claim is dubious: economists do not
offer a credible mechanism whereby deposit
insurance could lead to the ills they claim it
causes. Deposit insurance does not protect
the shareholders or the CEO—the two groups
(the first, in theory; the second, in practice)
that control a bank. It is the depositors who
are insured. Thus, they must be the ones who
are subject to moral hazard—in other words,
the argument against deposit insurance must
be based on the claim that it reduces the
incentive of depositors to exercise "private
market discipline" by pulling their money out

U.S. banks. A Brazilian default could have rendered several of our largest
banks insolvent. The banks were rescued by a combination of bailouts to
Brazil through the IMF and the World Bank and flawed (albeit permissible
under so-called Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP)
"troubled-debt restructuring" to cover up the losses. Brazil used the bailouts
to pay minimal interest on the U.S. bank loans and ultimately recovered;
while several U.S. banks took serious losses, none failed.
On the heels of this crisis came the savings and loan crisis, an
unprecedented debacle which saw the collapse of some 1,000 S&Ls and
which cost U.S. taxpayers about $125 billion dollars—primarily the cost of
repaying to depositors money that criminal S&L heads had literally stolen
from their institutions.
The causes of these crises are varied. They typically occur, however, when
large banks are in essence looted by their owners and managers (a
phenomenon known as "control fraud") or when there are financial bubbles
in which assets become massively overvalued.
Economists who conduct case studies of banking crises commonly report
the existence of substantial control fraud. Looting played a prominent role
in the S&L debacle. Here is the conclusion of the National Commission on
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement (NCFIRRE):
The typical large failure was a stockholder-owned, statechartered institution in Texas or California where regulation
and supervision were most lax. ... The failed institution
typically had experienced a change of control and was
tightly held, dominated by an individual with substantial
conflicts of interest. ... In the typical large failure, every
accounting trick available was used to make the institution
look profitable, safe, and solvent. Evidence of fraud was
invariably present as was the ability of the operators to
"milk" the organization through high dividends and salaries,
bonuses, perks and other means. In short, the typical large
failure was one in which management exploited virtually all
the perverse incentives created by government policy.
Looting has played a significant role in banking crises around the world. It
became so prevalent in the states of the former Soviet Union that it inspired
a new term of art, "tunneling," to describe the process of the CEO and
owners converting a company's funds to their private benefit.
In addition to the national banking crises, fraud has caused spectacular
failures of large banks. The Bank for Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI—known informally as the "Bank for Crooks and Criminals
International"), Barings Bank, and Continental Bank all stunned the public
when they failed. BCCI was the largest bank in the developing world,
Barings was England's oldest bank, and Continental was America's third

of a bank they believe is being poorly run or
looted. But there is no credible evidence that
depositors are capable of either discerning
frauds or avoiding runs on healthy banks
based on false rumors. Indeed, studies have
shown that even private-sector financial
experts who specialize in evaluating the
health of banks cannot do so effectively.
Proponents of the view that deposit insurance
causes banking failures display an
unrecognized logical inconsistency. Their
proposed reform is to rely on private market
discipline to prevent management from
looting the bank or lending imprudently in a
bubble. But, if we assume hypothetically that
private market discipline is effective against
CEOs who would be so inclined, then it
should normally be effective despite the
presence of deposit insurance. Deposit
insurance does not remove private market
discipline where the bank is owned by
shareholders (unless the CEO owns all the
stock) or where the bank issues uninsured
subordinated debt. Yet during the S&L crisis,
control fraud (the looting of an institution by
its own managers or owners) was most
common in S&Ls owned in stock form, with
the largest losses overwhelmingly among
stock S&Ls. In these cases deposit insurance
did not preclude private market discipline;
market discipline was simply inadequate to
prevent control fraud. Some opponents of
deposit insurance proclaim the S&L debacle
to be their primary example—a flat
misreading of the facts.
The empirical evidence economists use to
support their critique of deposit insurance is
inconsistent. Moreover, even where the
adoption of deposit insurance is correlated
with a rise in bank failures, the causal
relationship may be just the opposite of what
economists claim. Nations with early signs of
an impending banking crisis may adopt
deposit insurance to reduce the risks of runs.
Developing nations tend to adopt deposit
insurance in conjunction with privatization—
which itself often prompts a banking crisis.
More broadly, in part because of the fall of
the Soviet Union and the rise of the
neoliberal "Washington Consensus," the
number of nations adopting deposit insurance
increased sharply in the last two decades.
Banking crises have indeed been far more
common over this same period—precisely
because these radical transitions have been
occurring in nations with weak institutions,
too few regulators with too little experience,
patterns of bank ownership that maximize
conflicts of interest, and substantial

largest bank. Each one collapsed with minimal public warning.

corruption.

And, of course, more recently control fraud played a role in a number of
spectacular business failures outside of the banking industry including
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco. This fact makes it obvious that the
conventional economic wisdom, which blames this era's wave of bank
failures and banking crises on regulation and deposit insurance (which are
specific to the banking industry) is just wrong. Despite this, mainstream
economists persist in their diagnosis, rarely scrutinizing the deregulation
and privatization that many observers believe in fact triggered these crises.

In addition, empirical studies rely on
subjective coding of different countries'
deposit insurance policies, often done by
economists who oppose deposit insurance. In
countries with no formal deposit insurance,
implicit government guarantees for banks are
common. There are good theoretical and
historical reasons to argue that such implicit
guarantees—common in crony capitalism and
kleptocracies—create greater moral hazard
than explicit deposit insurance does because
they can be structured to bail out a bank's
shareholders and CEO as well as its creditors
(as was done in Chile). But there is no way to
code accurately for whether there was an
implicit guarantee (or whether bank CEOs
believed there was an implicit guarantee) in a
particular country at a particular time.

...They First Make Proud
Economists have dominated the creation of public policies to prevent
banking crises. Their track record has been abysmal. They designed and
implemented the disastrous deregulation that produced the U.S. S&L
debacle, they praised Japan's and East Asia's banking structures just before
they collapsed, and they designed the IMF's crisis intervention strategy that
intensified losses and human misery. They also designed and praised
privatization programs in many transition economies that led to banking
crises; they planned (and in some cases profited from) the catastrophic
failure of "shock therapy" in Russia. The irony is that when financial
experts were most confident in their consensus, they erred the most
grievously. As Mark Twain remarked: "It's not the things you don't know
that cause disasters; it's the things you do know, but aren't true."
This record of failure is disappointing and has caused great human
suffering. Remarkably, the economists' hubris is unaffected by it. They are
now engaged in a war against deposit insurance and regulation. At this
juncture, they are losing that war, but they are persevering in their effort to
reclaim their domination over banking policy.

Despite these weaknesses in both evidence
and analysis, World Bank economists draw
firm conclusions, opposing the adoption of
deposit insurance in any nation and clearly
hoping for its elimination. But the world has
rejected their advice. By 2006, 95 countries
had deposit insurance, over four times the
number in 1983. Moreover, economists'
suggestions on how to "improve" deposit
insurance (require banks to issue
subordinated debt, charge variable rates for
deposit insurance, or require private
insurance of accounts) are rarely adopted and
have proven unsuccessful in practice.

Neoclassical banking economists are failing in this arena for three reasons. First, they neither study nor understand
fraud mechanisms and the institutions that are essential to limit fraud and corruption. Second, they are shackled by
an ideology that presumes that unfettered markets always produce the best outcomes and that government
intervention is always bad. For instance, in their writings many of the World Bank's banking economists display a
passionate contempt for democratic government and banking regulators. Third, they are mono-disciplinary. They
rarely cite (and no doubt rarely examine) the literature in other relevant fields such as political science, sociology,
and white-collar criminology.
Indeed, although it should be central to their study of crisis prevention, they rarely even cite the work of economist
and 2001 Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof. Based on their study of the S&L crisis, which found that looting was
a major cause of total S&L losses, Akerlof and Paul Romer developed an economic model of the looting control
fraud.
Looters use accounting fraud to make a company appear extraordinarily profitable. Consider the S&L crisis. The
worst S&L control frauds were the ones reporting the highest profitability. Moreover, the control frauds were
routinely able to get a Big 8 audit firm to give them "clean" GAAP (or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
the official standard of review in the U.S. accounting industry) opinions for false financial statements.

Economists, in turn, relied on reported accounting profits and share prices (which rose along with reported profits)
to determine whether a given S&L was well run. But relying on reported accounting earnings or stock prices must
lead to perverse results when a wave of looting control frauds is expanding. Thanks to their fraudulent accounting,
whatever strategies control frauds follow will look profitable, and hence praiseworthy. In the S&Ls, this led
economists to praise (1) domination by an owner/CEO; (2) extremely rapid growth; (3) changes of control; and (4)
large investments in acquisition, development, and contruction (ADC) loans and direct investments. Lo and behold,
these factors turned out to characterize the worst failures. In other words, standard econometrics techniques led
economists to praise that which was fraudulent and fatal. The error was so great that they identified the worst S&L
in the nation as the best.
Worse, economists persist in the same error. During the recent expansion of the even larger wave of looting control
frauds such as Enron, economists touted (1) conflicts of interest at the top audit firms (which they euphemistically
restyled as "synergies"); (2) using a top-tier auditor; (3) rapid growth; and (4) granting the CEO greater stock
options as positive factors that were leading to increased profits and higher share prices. It was only after the looters
began to collapse that variables like these reversed their sign (from a positive to a negative correlation) and
displayed their true relationship to business failure. Economists are doomed to repeat these mistakes until they adopt
statistical techniques that cannot be gamed by accounting fraud.
The Economists' War Against Banking Regulation
In keeping with their skewed analysis of the recent wave of bank failures and banking crises, banking economists,
including those at the World Bank and the IMF, have been waging a war against banking regulation. It is a curious
assault that rests on implicit and false dichotomies between market and regulation and between types of regulation.
The World Bank economists recognize that regulation is vital to mandate accurate disclosure of corporate financial
information and aid private market enforcement, but appear to believe that regulatory strength is unnecessary to
induce banks to provide accurate information. That view is illogical and incorrect. Obtaining accurate information
about banks is the heart of banking examination. Regulators use their powers primarily to pry out accurate
information from the fraudulent; control frauds do not cooperate voluntarily.
Economists' rationale for opposing strong banking regulators typically rests
on public choice theory, which holds that the actors in political systems act
to maximize their own self-interest. This analysis paints politicians as
corrupt and regulators as "captured" by the industries they are supposed to
be regulating. World Bank economist Thorsten Beck and his colleagues
summed up this view in 2003 and 2006 working papers:
Politicians may induce banks to divert the flow of credit to
politically connected firms, or powerful banks may
"capture" politicians and induce official supervisors to act
in the best interest of banks ....
Government solutions to overcome market failures ... have been proven
wrong in Bangladesh as across the developed and developing world. ...
Indeed, powerful regulators are worse than futile—they are corrupt and
harmful.
Again, this analysis is nonsensical. If banks can dominate politicians and
strong regulators, they can certainly dominate the design of the disclosure
standards they face. In that case, pursuant to the economists' own logic, the

Offshore Banks
One particularly dark side of globalization is
the rise of new offshore banks. While
Switzerland now has reasonably workable
procedures for tracking the funds of
kleptocrats and drug traffickers, several small
nations have adopted extreme forms of bank
secrecy designed to cater to the needs of
criminals and tax evaders. Corporations often
incorporate in a tax haven because of the
extremely low tax rates. In the late 1990s, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, an organization of the world's
industrialized countries, created an initiative
to try to curtail these abuses. Conservative
think tanks sought to kill the OECD plan and
convinced President Bush to block its
implementation as one of his earliest actions.
The administration reduced its opposition to
the OECD initiative after the 9/11 attacks,
when it became clear that terrorists used the
offshore banks as their preferred means to

move funds.
banks will submit, and politicians beholden to them will permit, deceptive
financial reports that grossly overstate banks' value. (This has, in fact, been
done in many cases.) Accounting fraud, in turn, renders markets deeply inefficient and causes private market
discipline to become perverse. The looters report record profits. Credit is supposed to flow to the most profitable
banks. So private markets aid the CEOs looting their banks by providing them with the funds to expand rapidly.
Again, the failure to understand bank accounting fraud mechanisms, which have been well explained by Akerlof
and Romer, leads to a deeply flawed analysis. (In lieu of Akerlof and Romer, the anti-regulation economists
frequently cite work sponsored by Michael Milken's institute. Milken was the notorious junk-bond king and looter
who caused large losses during the S&L crisis by recruiting and funding several of the worst control frauds, such as
Charles Keating. Today, Milken's institute blames the S&L debacle on regulation and seeks to rehabilitate his
reputation.

This overarching logical error, their hostility to democracy, and their view of public officials as inevitably rapacious
leads economists to a claim that only private parties should exert discipline against banks. The view has a number of
problems. First, it is overstated. Regulators in some nations do resist political pressure. In the S&L crisis, many
regulators did their job despite intense political pressure and saved over a trillion dollars in the process. On the other
hand: if, over time, people are taught to believe that it is normal and rational for public officials to be rapacious, this
can become a self-fulfilling prophecy as those who aim to enrich themselves sign on to become officials. Moreover,
the argument proves too much. If the banks (or politicians) are powerful enough to act illegitimately through
regulators, they are powerful enough to act illegitimately without regulators to achieve the same result. The
argument is also based on a fundamental misunderstanding of control frauds. It is not the "powerful banks" Beck
and his coauthors refer to that put pressure on regulators or politicians—it is the CEOs or their agents who do. They
do not coerce regulators "to act in the best interest of banks." They coerce them in an attempt to act to help the CEO
loot the bank.
In fact, the evidence shows that private parties are more subject to capture
than public officials. Looting control frauds are routinely able to get top-tier
audit firms to give their blessing to massive accounting fraud. The ratings
agencies do no better against control fraud. Our most prestigious law firms
have helped CEOs loot and destroy their clients. Private deposit insurance
funds for thrifts used to exist in many states. None do now. The Maryland,
Ohio, and Utah funds were each destroyed by the very first thrift that
collapsed in their state thanks to control fraud. No private insurer made
more than a feeble effort to exercise discipline. Instead, they acted as
boosters for the CEOs who looted and destroyed their own thrifts and
brought down the insurance funds with them.
Finally, the empirical studies on banking regulation rely on coding of data
by economists who typically oppose regulation, rendering the results
unreliable. The risks of subjective bias are acute. There is no objective
measure of "strong" regulation, or capture, or "rent seeking behavior." We
know that economists have claimed that the Bank Board under Chairman
Edwin Gray was captured during the S&L crisis. Not so. In fact, private
experts were routinely captured by the S&L control frauds. Plus, the studies
focus on formal supervisory power, yet informal banking supervision is
widespread and often a regulator's most effective tool. Overall, empirical
studies find that better quality regulation (again, to be fair, a subjective
concept) reduces banking losses.
International Convergence

They Just Never Learn
Today's financial crisis offers a superb
example of how their methods lead
mainstream economists to endorse both
private practices and public policies that are
perverse. The current crisis exemplifies a
variant of accounting control frauds—one in
which the CEO and top managers "skim"
rather than loot the company—and
demonstrates the unrecognized economic
costs of obscenely high CEO pay. The
incentives created by typical CEO
compensation packages in the financial
services industry produce bad investment
decisions, decisions that increase the CEO's
ability to skim, but that expose the financial
institution to losses and the nation and world
to recurrent financial crises.
Consider the plight of the honest chief
financial officer (CFO) in the modern
financial world. His counterparts at rival
firms are earning record returns by investing
in subprime mortgages. Economists trumpet
studies showing that banks' income is
boosted by practices he questions, including:

•
•

Making more subprime mortgages
Making more of the worst

Despite the flawed logic and lack of empirical support for their views,
conventional banking economists, including those at the World Bank,
continue to voice opposition to the creation of strong supervisory agencies.
For now, however, their call has been rejected.
In the 1980s, the U.S. government reacted to Japan's emergence as the new
(apparent) dominant financial power by claiming that Japan gained an
unfair advantage because its banks were permitted to operate with lower
capital reserves. If all other factors are held constant, a bank held to a lower
capital reserve requirement can grow more quickly, lend more cheaply, and
finance greater economic growth. Complaining that the playing field was
not level, the United States insisted on an international agreement to set
minimum bank capital standards. The U.S. effort succeeded in 1988, when
the largest industrial nations adopted the Basel Accord. More recently, the
accord was revised and expanded ("Basel II") to include more closely
calibrated minimum capital requirements as well as a supervisory strategy
of "prompt corrective action" against banks that fail to meet the capital
requirements and a strategy to make private market discipline more
effective by requiring banks to disclose more information.
The Basel Accord was a major step towards greater international uniformity
of banking regulation ("convergence") among developed nations. The
expansion of the European Union is another major force for convergence, as
candidate nations must adopt modern banking laws and regulatory
structures meeting the EU's minimum standards.
Banks are also subject to an increasing number of international treaties
designed to restrict money laundering and bribery. There are, however, very
few enforcement actions or prosecutions, so enforcement does not appear to
be effective at this time. In addition, offshore banks remain an enormous
loophole limiting the effectiveness of convergence. New banking crises
have diminished substantially in nations complying with the Basel accords.
Of course, it is too early to judge whether the Basel process is responsible
for this success. However, we do have cross-country evidence showing that
weak regulation leads to recurrent waves of control fraud. Tests of Basel's
effectiveness by one of the World Bank economists find positive
relationships between stronger regulation and bank health. (These tests
employed a methodology that posed less risk of subjective bias by the
economists conducting the studies, but they remain inherently subjective.)
The economists' frustration, however, is understandable. They are skilled
research scientists for whom econometric studies are the epitome of proof.
Contrary case studies are mere "anecdotal evidence" that are fully
encompassed within their data and, therefore, require no refutation.
Moreover, their worldview is shaped by public choice theory. They view
banking regulators as corrupt, "rent seeking" parasites who merely pretend
to virtue. Alternatively, in their "capture" model, regulators are cowards
who roll over to aid the control frauds. They have not been banking

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

mortgages such as "Ninja" loans
(no verification of income, job or
assets), also known as "liars' loans"
Making subprime loans at
particularly high interest rates—
which draws in the riskiest
borrowers because only the worst
credit risks and frauds will apply
Making loans as quickly as
possible
Growing as quickly as possible
Reducing internal controls against
fraud
Making loans in cities known to be
"hot spots" for mortgage fraud
Qualifying borrowers by offering
"teaser" interest rates that will soon
increase substantially
Making loans in areas with rapidly
inflation housing bubbles
Purchasing and holding in portfolio
high-yield CDOs (collateralized
debt obligations, the investment
instruments backed by bundles of
mortgages and other loans, often of
high risk)
Keeping minimal reserves against
losses

When a housing bubble is expanding, these
practices dramatically increase fees and other
noninterest income, minimize expenses, and
produce relatively few losses. (Losses remain
low as long as house prices are rising because
borrowers who get in trouble can sell their
house for more than they owe or else
refinance based on its market value.) Note
that this pretty income picture requires
accounting and securities fraud, though:
reserving properly for the future losses
inherent in subjecting the financial institution
to this vastly increased default risk would
remove the fictional accounting gain.
The combination of dramatically increased
revenue, moderately reduced expenses, and
minimal loss means that financial institutions
that invest heavily in subprime mortgages
and CDOs must report record profits while
the bubble is hyperinflating.
So what is our honest CFO to do? If she does
not follow the pack, her company will report
substantially lower income. Its stock price
will fall relative to its rivals. The CEO's and
CFO's compensation and wealth will fall
sharply as raises disappear, bonuses decline,
and the value of their shares and stock

regulators, so they are uncontaminated and can see the truth as the empirical
data reveal it to them.

options falls. The CFO may be fired.
The upshot is that modern compensation
systems and the short-term perspective of
investors and senior managers all result in
perverse incentives to make grossly
imprudent investments in those assets
experiencing the worst bubbles. This creates
a destructive cycle in which large numbers of
financial institutions follow the same
dysfunctional strategy, which in turn extends
and inflates the bubble and produces even
more accounting control frauds.

Regulators, however, dominate much of the Basel process. They view the
economists' disdain as an inaccurate and insulting caricature that indicates
their ignorance of the real-world banking business. Regulators tend to
believe in their experiences, which overwhelmingly teach that control
frauds exploit regulatory weaknesses and that normally honest, sober
bankers act like frat boys on spring break during financial bubbles.
Imprudent lending is the norm in bubbles. Regulators have seen many
econometric "proofs" of propositions they know to be false from
experience. Some of them have a reasonably sophisticated understanding of
the illusion of precision in empirical work and the many opportunities for subjective coding to lead even the best
scholars into error. To date, the regulators have staved off the economists' war against banking regulation, and even
the World Bank's economists have had to concede that the initial results of the Basel process are extremely positive.
Basel II does have a worrying component. It encourages the large banks to value their assets (which implicitly
means evaluating their risk) using their own proprietary models. It is easy for these models to be designed so as to
dramatically overstate asset values. The problem is compounded by the nature of proprietary models: they are
secret, complex, and (perhaps) subject to frequent adjustment. That makes them a nightmare to try to regulate. And
in what is essentially a form of control fraud, modern compensation systems, especially in the United States, create
powerful incentives for top managers to overstate banks' asset values in order to puff up their own pay packages.
Such abuse is so common that instead of "mark to market," the usual term for bringing the valuation of an asset into
line with its market price, the process is often known to insiders as "mark to myth."
In the United States, the word "deregulation" still has a positive ring for many despite the disastrous results of this
country's experiment in loosening the reins on the banking industry. So perhaps it is ironic that it was the United
States that instigated an international effort to develop convergent banking regulations worldwide. International
convergence is moving forward, and for now the pace of new financial crises has slowed. The Basel process is
indeed leveling the playing field among financial services companies around the world. But what kind of field will
emerge? Does the Basel process offer any hope of reshaping the new world of banking into one that better meets
consumer needs and better serves the broader public interest? If the banking economists, with their ideological
commitment to oppose any regulation, are kept at bay, then at least we may find out.
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